Alerts

ISC StormCast for Tuesday, July 8th 2014 http://isc.sans.edu/podcastdetail.html?id=4051, (Mon, Jul 7th)

Latest Alerts - Mon, 07/07/2014 - 14:11
(c) SANS Internet Storm Center. https://isc.sans.edu Creative Commons Attribution-Noncommercial 3.0 United States License.
Categories: Alerts

Multi Platform *Coin Miner Attacking Routers on Port 32764, (Mon, Jul 7th)

Latest Alerts - Mon, 07/07/2014 - 13:43

Thanks to reader Gary for sending us in a sample of a *Coin miner that he found attacking Port 32764. Port 32764 was recently found to offer yet another backdoor on Sercomm equipped devices. We covered this backdoor before [1]

The bot itself appears to be a variant of the "zollard" worm sean before by Symantec [2]. Symantec's writeup describes the worm as attacking a php-cgi vulnerability, not the Sercomm backdoor. But this worm has been seen using various exploits.

Here some quick, very preliminary, details:

The reason I call it *Coin vs. Bitcoin is that in the past, we found these miners to mostly attack non-Bitcoin crypto-currencies to make use of the limited capabilities of these devices. I do not have sufficient detail yet about this variant.

Interestingly, Gary found what looks like 5 binaries with identical functionality, but compiled for 4 different architecture providing for larger coverage across possible vulnerable devices. The binaries are named according to the architecture they support.

Name Size "file" output arm 86680 ELF 32-bit LSB executable, ARM, version 1, statically linked, stripped armeabi 131812 ELF 32-bit LSB executable, ARM, EABI5 version 1 (SYSV), statically linked, stripped mips 140352 ELF 32-bit MSB executable, MIPS, MIPS-I version 1 (SYSV), statically linked, stripped mipsel 141288 ELF 32-bit LSB executable, MIPS, MIPS-I version 1 (SYSV), statically linked, stripped x86 74332 ELF 32-bit LSB executable, Intel 80386, version 1 (SYSV), statically linked, stripped

The binary appears to do the following among other things:

  • delete and then recreate the /tmp directory (to have an empty one for download)
  • create a directory /var/run/.zollard
  • firewall port 23 (telnet) and 32764 (trying to avoid re-exploitation. Port 23 is odd ...)
  • start the telnet demon (odd that it also firewalls port 23)
  • it uses this user agent for some outbound requests: Mozilla/5.0 (compatible; Zollard; Linux)
  • setup a php file with a backdoor (simple php "exec") 

It also looks like there are many other variants for different architectures based on string in the file Gary sent us.

[1] https://isc.sans.edu/diary/Port+32764+Router+Backdoor+is+Back+(or+was+it+ever+gone%3F)/18009
[2] http://www.symantec.com/connect/blogs/linux-worm-targeting-hidden-devices

---

Johannes B. Ullrich, Ph.D.
STI|Twitter|LinkedIn

(c) SANS Internet Storm Center. https://isc.sans.edu Creative Commons Attribution-Noncommercial 3.0 United States License.
Categories: Alerts

Physical Access, Point of Sale, Vegas, (Sun, Jul 6th)

Latest Alerts - Sun, 07/06/2014 - 08:37

Physical Access [1], as most of us know, is the final point of control. While in Las Vegas (on a well earned vacation) my wife and wandered all over. It only took around a day of being completely unplugged before my mind wandered back to 'security' land. While scoping out places to eat my partner drug us into a 'pricey' looking place (will attempt to remain nameless to protect the 'really' not so smart, however I am not a photo editor so if something slipped, I tried).

When we get into this place, at first in tourist-mode, had a lot of things designed to take my money. After spending a little bit more time in the place, I was most curious about the point of sale suite. Then I noticed, where it was placed, convenient on the floor, but the attendant not that close, distracted from the clients. It get’s worse, when I spending more time by the counter the attendant did even notice (as expected sadly) [2].

 

At this point I suspected that I could easily drop a USB key or a leave behind device and decided to take a quick picture of all the ports accessible.


If you look at the photo closely:

 

  1. I was not challenged by anyone
  2. I had plenty of time to snap a shot
  3. Easy access to a USB port
  4. Well known Point of Sale System
  5. Premium Las Vegas location
  6. Printed and taped details near device

 

Conclusion? I paid cash (Not that it helps much, but sure did make me feel better)! Physical security and awareness of your staff regarding it cannot be missed. Reduce your attack surface anyone?

Are you picky about PoS locations now? What things have changed in your shopping habits?

 

References:

[1] http://www.sans.edu/research/security-laboratory/article/281

[2] http://www.police.psu.edu/physical-security/what-is-physical-security.cfm

 

(c) SANS Internet Storm Center. https://isc.sans.edu Creative Commons Attribution-Noncommercial 3.0 United States License.
Categories: Alerts

Malware Analysis with pedump, (Sat, Jul 5th)

Latest Alerts - Sat, 07/05/2014 - 08:20

Are you looking for a tool to analyze Windows Portable Executable (PE) files? Consider using pedump a ruby win32 PE binary file analyzer. It currently support DOS MZ EXE, win16 NE and win32/64 PE.

There are several ways to install the ruby package; however, the simplest way is to execute "gem install pedump" from a Linux workstation. You can also download the file here or use the pedump website to upload your file for analysis. This example shows the output from the pedump website.

You can obtain the same results as this output with the command line version by executing "pedump --all  SetupCasinoRoyal.exe".

The command line version doesn't currently have foremost, hexdump or the disassembler function. However, you can get the same hexdump output by executing "hexdump -C SetupCasinoRoyal.exe" from your Unix system.

guy@seeker:~/malware/casino$ hexdump -C SetupCasinoRoyal.exe |more
00000000  4d 5a 90 00 03 00 00 00  04 00 00 00 ff ff 00 00  |MZ..............|
00000010  b8 00 00 00 00 00 00 00  40 00 00 00 00 00 00 00  |........@.......|
00000020  00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00  00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00  |................|
00000030  00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00  00 00 00 00 10 01 00 00  |................|
00000040  0e 1f ba 0e 00 b4 09 cd  21 b8 01 4c cd 21 54 68  |.............!Th|
00000050  69 73 20 70 72 6f 67 72  61 6d 20 63 61 6e 6e 6f  |is program canno|
00000060  74 20 62 65 20 72 75 6e  20 69 6e 20 44 4f 53 20  |t be run in DOS |
00000070  6d 6f 64 65 2e 0d 0d 0a  24 00 00 00 00 00 00 00  |mode....$.......|

This tool provides an easy way to dump headers, find packers and resources used by exe and dll, in the end providing a quick look inside suspicious PE file.

[1] http://pedump.me/
[2] http://pedump.me/89c10738fb44f9a529092bfa3c15dcf9/#resources    
[3] https://github.com/zed-0xff/pedump
[4] https://rubygems.org/gems/pedump
[5] https://github.com/zed-0xff/pedump/archive/master.zip
[6] http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Portable_Executable

-----------

Guy Bruneau IPSS Inc. gbruneau at isc dot sans dot edu

(c) SANS Internet Storm Center. https://isc.sans.edu Creative Commons Attribution-Noncommercial 3.0 United States License.
Categories: Alerts

Java Support ends for Windows XP, (Sat, Jul 5th)

Latest Alerts - Fri, 07/04/2014 - 16:56

Oracle is no longer supporting Java for Windows XP and will only support Windows Vista or later. Java 8 is not supported for Windows XP and users will be unable to install on their systems. Oracle warns "Users may still continue to use Java 7 updates on Windows XP at their own risk" [1]

[1] https://www.java.com/en/download/faq/winxp.xml
[2] http://www.oracle.com/us/support/library/057419.pdf

-----------

Guy Bruneau IPSS Inc. gbruneau at isc dot sans dot edu

(c) SANS Internet Storm Center. https://isc.sans.edu Creative Commons Attribution-Noncommercial 3.0 United States License.
Categories: Alerts

Microsoft Security Bulletin Advance Notification for July 2014, (Fri, Jul 4th)

Latest Alerts - Fri, 07/04/2014 - 06:36

Microsoft have published the 'heads-up' for this months patching party, with six bulletins two of which are flagged as being critical in nature.

 

For more details, go their notification, but for a quick look, I've reproduced their table below:

Bulletin ID

Maximum Severity Rating and Vulnerability Impact

Restart Requirement

Affected Software

Bulletin 1

Critical 
Remote Code Execution

Requires restart

Microsoft Windows, 
Internet Explorer

Bulletin 2

Critical 
Remote Code Execution

May require restart

Microsoft Windows

Bulletin 3

Important 
Elevation of Privilege

Requires restart

Microsoft Windows

Bulletin 4

Important 
Elevation of Privilege

Requires restart

Microsoft Windows

Bulletin 5

Important 
Elevation of Privilege

May require restart

Microsoft Windows

Bulletin 6

Moderate 
Denial of Service

Does not require restart

Microsoft Server Software

 

 

Steve Hall ISC Handler www.tarkie.net

(c) SANS Internet Storm Center. https://isc.sans.edu Creative Commons Attribution-Noncommercial 3.0 United States License.
Categories: Alerts

Credit Card Processing in 700 Words or Less, (Thu, Jul 3rd)

Latest Alerts - Thu, 07/03/2014 - 11:06

When PF Changs published an update about it's breach earlier this week, a few readers asked about the use of "encrypted terminals". Aren't all credit card transactions "encrypted"? The quick answer is: yes. But not all transactions are encrypted all the time.

To answer some of these questions, I figured I will use this diary as a TL;DR edition to credit card processing. There are a number of terms that are often confused when it comes to credit cards, and how they are processed.

If you enter a credit card on a web site, the process is typically pretty straight forward if implemented correctly: The credit card reaches the web server via SSL. The web server then typically hands the card to a payment processor (again: via SSL) and receives a confirmation code back that can later be used to identify the transaction. The confirmation code is often shared with the customer and doesn't require an specific safeguarding. It may be used to void the transaction. But this would also require the merchants credentials in addition to the code, so the customer can't void it without the merchant's approval.

The merchant does not need to store the credit card number. As should not store it at all. However, the credit card number is still exposed in memory while it is being processed and careless coding often leads to data like credit card numbers being logged. So while the card can't be read off the wire, it can still be read off the server if the server is compromised.

Now what about repeat billing? Does your phone company need to store the number so it can charge your credit card once a month? No. In addition to a confirmation number, the credit card processor can hand a token back to the merchant. The merchant can now use this token to apply additional charges to the card. This token is only good for a particular merchant. If it is stolen, an attacker could charge the account, but any funds would go to the merchant the token was stolen from, not to the attacker. More interesting: The token is linked to your account, not your credit card number. If you receive a new credit card number (e.g. after your card was compromised), the merchant is still able to charge the account. This is very convenient for recurring payments like utility bills.

Where things get actually more interesting these days is retail scenarios. Many people still think that handing your card to a clerk is more secure then typing it into a website. However, what happens is essentially the same thing as when you type it into a website, with the exception that the clerk swipes the card at a PoS system, that may be compromised (just like your PC may be compromised when you type in the number). 

The best defense against a compromised PoS system is to encrypt the number in the reader, before it hits the PoS system. Some readers support this feature, and it requires that the reader be used with a specific processor who holds the decryption key. You (as owner of the PoS system) have no idea what card was used, neither has the pw0n3r of the PoS system. A popular implementation of this technique is the Square reader that can be plugged into the audio jack of a cell phone to turn it into a credit card reader. Since the phone is considered un-trusted, the CC data is encrypted inside the reader and then passed encrypted to Square. 

Why doesn't everybody do that? Two reasons: Some merchants like to "see" the CC track data to identify the customer and use it for purchase tracking. Secondly, this option is a bit more recent and older systems don't support it.

Where does "Chip-and-Pin" fit in? Chip and Pin does not encrypt any data. It just authenticates the terminal. In this case, if the card is stolen, an attacker can not produce a fake card that could be used at a chip and pin terminal, and skimmers will have a harder time reading the information. But a card number stolen from a compromised Chip-and-Pin PoS system can still be used online or to create a non Chip-and-Pin card.

I hope this clears up some of the questions regarding recent breaches.

---
Johannes B. Ullrich, Ph.D.
STI|Twitter|LinkedIn

(c) SANS Internet Storm Center. https://isc.sans.edu Creative Commons Attribution-Noncommercial 3.0 United States License.
Categories: Alerts

ISC StormCast for Thursday, July 3rd 2014 http://isc.sans.edu/podcastdetail.html?id=4049, (Thu, Jul 3rd)

Latest Alerts - Wed, 07/02/2014 - 16:28
(c) SANS Internet Storm Center. https://isc.sans.edu Creative Commons Attribution-Noncommercial 3.0 United States License.
Categories: Alerts

Simple Javascript Extortion Scheme Advertised via Bing, (Wed, Jul 2nd)

Latest Alerts - Wed, 07/02/2014 - 12:49

Thanks to our reader Dan for spotting this one.

As of today, a search for "Katie Matusik" on Bing will include the following result. The rank has been slowly rising during the day, and as of right now, it is the first link after the link to "Videos" 

Once a user clicks on the link, the user is redirected to http://system-check-yueedfms.in/js which loads a page claiming that the user's browser is locked, and the user is asked to pay a fine via "Moneypak", a Western-Union like payment system. Overall, the page is done pretty bad and I find it actually a bit difficult to figure out how much money they are asking to ($300??).


(click on image for full size)

The user is no not able to close the browser or change to a different site. However, just rebooting the system will clear things up again, or you have to be persistent enough in clicking "Leave this Page" as there are a large number of iframes that each insert a message if closed.

The link was reported to Bing this morning but the result has been rising in Bing's search since then. Respective hosting providers for the likely compromised WordPress blog have been notified. 

Quick update: For "katie matysik" (replace 'u' with 'y', the correct spelling of the ), Bing now returns the malicious site as #1 link. Both spellings are valid last names, so either may be the original target of the SEO operation.

---
Johannes B. Ullrich, Ph.D.
STI|Twitter|LinkedIn

(c) SANS Internet Storm Center. https://isc.sans.edu Creative Commons Attribution-Noncommercial 3.0 United States License.
Categories: Alerts

Cisco Unified Communications Domain Manager Update, (Wed, Jul 2nd)

Latest Alerts - Wed, 07/02/2014 - 09:06

Yet another round of patches, this time for Cisco's Unified Communications Domain Manager [1].

The vulnerability that is probably going to be exploited first is the backdoor Cisco left behind for support access. In order to provide Cisco support with access to customer equipment, the company felt it was a great idea to equip all instances with the same SSH key. 

Having the same key on all systems is mistake number one, but wouldn't be fatal if the secret key would have been tugged away in Cisco's special safedeposit box. Instead, they left the secret key on customer systems as well. So in other words: If you own one of the systems, you got the key to access all of them.

Filtering SSH access to the device at your border is a good first step to protect yourself if you can't patch right away.

[1] http://tools.cisco.com/security/center/content/CiscoSecurityAdvisory/cisco-sa-20140702-cucdm

---
Johannes B. Ullrich, Ph.D.
STI|Twitter|LinkedIn

(c) SANS Internet Storm Center. https://isc.sans.edu Creative Commons Attribution-Noncommercial 3.0 United States License.
Categories: Alerts

July Ouch! Security Awareness Newsletter Released. E-mail Do's and Don'ts http://www.securingthehuman.org/resources/newsletters/ouch/2014#july2014, (Wed, Jul 2nd)

Latest Alerts - Wed, 07/02/2014 - 04:22

---
Johannes B. Ullrich, Ph.D.
STI|Twitter|LinkedIn

(c) SANS Internet Storm Center. https://isc.sans.edu Creative Commons Attribution-Noncommercial 3.0 United States License.
Categories: Alerts

ISC StormCast for Wednesday, July 2nd 2014 http://isc.sans.edu/podcastdetail.html?id=4047, (Wed, Jul 2nd)

Latest Alerts - Tue, 07/01/2014 - 17:17
(c) SANS Internet Storm Center. https://isc.sans.edu Creative Commons Attribution-Noncommercial 3.0 United States License.
Categories: Alerts

Microsoft No-IP Takedown , (Tue, Jul 1st)

Latest Alerts - Tue, 07/01/2014 - 04:02

Microsoft obtained a court order allowing it to take over various domains owned by free dynamic DNS provider "No-IP" [1]. According to a statement from Microsoft, this was done to disrupt several botnets [2] . However, No-IP is crying foul, stating that Microsoft never contacted them to have the malicious domains blocked. Further, Microsoft is apparently not able to properly filter and support all queries for these seized domains, causing widespread disruption among legit no-ip customers. According to the court order, Microsoft is able to take over DNS for the affected domains, but because the legit domains far outnumber the malicious domains, Microsoft is only allowed to block requests for malicious domains.

Microsoft apparently overestimated the abilities of it's Azure cloud service to deal with these requests.

In the past, various networks blocked dynamic IP providers, and dynamic IP services have been abused by criminals for about as long as they exist. However, No-IP had an abuse handling system in place and took down malicious domains in the past. The real question is if No-IP's abuse handling worked "as advertised" or if No-IP ignored take down requests. I have yet to find the details to that in the law suit (it is pretty long...) and I am not sure what measure Microsoft used to proof that No-IP was negligent.

For example, a similar justification may be used to filter services like Amazon's (or Microsoft's?) cloud services which are often used to serve malware [4][5]. It should make users relying on these services think twice about the business continuity implications of legal actions against other customers of the same cloud service. There is also no clear established SLA for abuse handling, or what level of criminal activity constitutes abuse.

[1] http://www.noticeoflawsuit.com
[2] http://blogs.technet.com/b/microsoft_blog/archive/2014/06/30/microsoft-takes-on-global-cybercrime-epidemic-in-tenth-malware-disruption.aspx
[3] http://www.noip.com/blog/2014/06/30/ips-formal-statement-microsoft-takedown/?utm_source=email&utm_medium=notice&utm_campaign=takedown
[4] http://blog.malwarebytes.org/fraud-scam/2014/04/cyber-criminals-interested-in-microsoft-azure-too/
[5] http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/the-switch/wp/2014/01/16/amazon-is-a-hornets-nest-of-malware/

---
Johannes B. Ullrich, Ph.D.
STI|Twitter|LinkedIn

(c) SANS Internet Storm Center. https://isc.sans.edu Creative Commons Attribution-Noncommercial 3.0 United States License.
Categories: Alerts

ISC StormCast for Tuesday, July 1st 2014 http://isc.sans.edu/podcastdetail.html?id=4045, (Tue, Jul 1st)

Latest Alerts - Mon, 06/30/2014 - 17:18
(c) SANS Internet Storm Center. https://isc.sans.edu Creative Commons Attribution-Noncommercial 3.0 United States License.
Categories: Alerts

Apple Releases Patches for All Products, (Tue, Jul 1st)

Latest Alerts - Mon, 06/30/2014 - 17:04

Apple today released patches for most (all?) of its operating systems. For more details from Apple, see http://support.apple.com/kb/ht1222.

- OS X has been updated to 10.9.4 (Security Update 2014-003). The security update is also available for older versions of OS X.
- Safari has been updated to 6.1.5 and 7.0.5
- iOS has been updated to 7.1.2
- Apple TV has been updated to 6.2.

The largest common source of patches for all of these products is WebKit. The updates should be applied in a timely manner. There is no indication at this point about active exploits. The iOS update also patches a problem that would allow an attacker to bypass activation lock, as well as an lock screen bypass that has been demoed publicly a couple weeks ago.

---
Johannes B. Ullrich, Ph.D.
STI|Twitter|LinkedIn

(c) SANS Internet Storm Center. https://isc.sans.edu Creative Commons Attribution-Noncommercial 3.0 United States License.
Categories: Alerts

Should I setup a Honeypot? [SANSFIRE], (Mon, Jun 30th)

Latest Alerts - Mon, 06/30/2014 - 07:28

During last weeks ISC handler panel at SANSFIRE, we had a lot more questions then we could answer. So I am trying to post some of these questions here over the next few days/weeks and please, chime in and give your answers as well. The questions will use the tag "SANSFIRE" and will also be labeled as such in the subject.

The first question we got: "How would one justify to management that setting up honeypots on the network is a good idea?"

The goal of having a honeypot is to learn more about your attackers. A honeypot will only see malicious traffic, making it easy to spot attacks. you can use data from successful attacks against a honeypot to derive indicators of compromise that are then used to detect similar attacks against business systems. Without the honeypot, it would be very difficult to spot these attacks due to all the other traffic a business system sees.

First of all, if you do setup a honeypot, make sure you do so correctly. The last thing you would like to have happen is to have the honeypot pose a risk to your network. Overall, there are a number of different kinds of honeypot. You could setup a "full interaction" honeypot. This is usually a vulnerable host complete with operating system and respective software. These full interaction honeypots do need a lot of care and supervision. They can easily be turned against you. If you decide to set one up: Don't make it too vulnerable. Configure it similar to your production system. The goal is not to find "any" attacker, but attackers that matter.

As an alternative to a full interaction honeypot, you may want to consider a medium-interaction honeypot. These honeypots simulate vulnerable services. They are a lot easier to maintain and generally safer. One such honeypot we discussed in the past is kippo, which simulates a vulnerable ssh server. The problem with these honeypots is that they are easily spotted by a sophisticated attacker. But they do allow you do collect malware attackers upload (so you can search for it on other systems).

Lastly, and in my opinion one of the most useful honeypots, are what some people call "honeytokens". Instead of dedicating a machine to the task of being a honeypot, you add little trap doors to existing applications. 2-3 such trap doors can do a good job identifying attackers who go the extra mile and do some manual work, vs. just running nmap/nessus and similar tools against your site.

Anybody here has a success story how data collected from a honeypot became useful?

---
Johannes B. Ullrich, Ph.D.
STI|Twitter|LinkedIn

(c) SANS Internet Storm Center. https://isc.sans.edu Creative Commons Attribution-Noncommercial 3.0 United States License.
Categories: Alerts

ISC StormCast for Monday, June 30th 2014 http://isc.sans.edu/podcastdetail.html?id=4043, (Mon, Jun 30th)

Latest Alerts - Sun, 06/29/2014 - 17:00
(c) SANS Internet Storm Center. https://isc.sans.edu Creative Commons Attribution-Noncommercial 3.0 United States License.
Categories: Alerts

Call for packets - Traffic from 116.177.0.0/16, (Fri, Jun 27th)

Latest Alerts - Fri, 06/27/2014 - 16:24

If you have log records or packets for traffic from this particular subnet.  If you have anything you can share I'd appreciate it.  

Likely what you will have is DNS open resolver checks, as well as SSH bruteforce pwd guessing attacks. I'm interested in those as well as anything else from this subnet. 

Regards

Mark H - markh.isc (at) gmail.com

(Thanks to those of you that have provided packets, logs and other info, much appreciated)

(c) SANS Internet Storm Center. https://isc.sans.edu Creative Commons Attribution-Noncommercial 3.0 United States License.
Categories: Alerts

No more Microsoft advisory email notifications? , (Sat, Jun 28th)

Latest Alerts - Fri, 06/27/2014 - 16:23

We had this sent to us today letting us know there will no longer be emails sent by Microsoft for advanced notifications, etc.  Instead people are to use the RSS feeds or other mechanisms.  

********************************************************************
Title: Microsoft Security Notifications
Issued: June 27, 2014
********************************************************************

Notice to IT professionals:

As of July 1, 2014, due to changing governmental policies concerning the issuance of automated electronic messaging, Microsoft is suspending the use of email notifications that announce the following:

* Security bulletin advance notifications
* Security bulletin summaries
* New security advisories and bulletins
* Major and minor revisions to security advisories and bulletins

In lieu of email notifications, you can subscribe to one or more of the RSS feeds described on the Security TechCenter website. 

For more information, or to sign up for an RSS feed, visit the Microsoft Technical Security Notifications webpage at http://technet.microsoft.com/security/dd252948

Not quite sure what legislation changes they might be referring to (haven't seen anything yet). Either way if like me you used to receive these emails, you may no longer and you'll have to subscribe to the RSS feed.  

I couldn't find anything on the Microsoft website (let me know if you can), but when following the links for "sign up for email notification" every page visited only has an RSS or web option, no email.  

Cheers

Mark H  - Shearwater

(c) SANS Internet Storm Center. https://isc.sans.edu Creative Commons Attribution-Noncommercial 3.0 United States License.
Categories: Alerts

PHP 5.4.30 has been released. More info here http://www.php.net/ChangeLog-5.php#5.4.30, (Sat, Jun 28th)

Latest Alerts - Fri, 06/27/2014 - 16:09
(c) SANS Internet Storm Center. https://isc.sans.edu Creative Commons Attribution-Noncommercial 3.0 United States License.
Categories: Alerts
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