Alerts

Merry Christmas!, (Thu, Dec 25th)

Latest Alerts - Thu, 12/25/2014 - 09:33

All handlers at SANS Internet Storm Center wish you a great christmas and may all your wishes come true. We will keep guarding the internet meanwhile.

Manuel Humberto Santander Pelez
SANS Internet Storm Center - Handler
Twitter:@manuelsantander
Web:http://manuel.santander.name
e-mail: msantand at isc dot sans dot org

(c) SANS Internet Storm Center. https://isc.sans.edu Creative Commons Attribution-Noncommercial 3.0 United States License.
Categories: Alerts

Incident Response at Sony, (Wed, Dec 24th)

Latest Alerts - Wed, 12/24/2014 - 14:41

For those of you who are not aware; Sony currently has a job posting for a Manager of Incident Response.Where I come from they refer to that as closing the barn door after the horse has got out, They do need to start somewhere and all in all it sounds like a cool job for an experienced Incident Handler. They do mention SANS certifications. Of course they do put SANS certifications on the same level as CISSP and CISM, but it is a step.

My piece of advice for the new IR manager at Sony is to go back and review, and update, their incident response plans since the Sony response to this incident was farcical at best. Matthew Schwartz at InfoRiskTodayhas published a post describing Sonys 7 Breach Response Mistakes Preparation, Identification, Containment, Eradication, Recovery, and Lessons Learned. Assuming that Sony had an IR plan, and followed it, comparing this methodology to the Sony mistakes, it struck me that most of Sonys failures resulted from insufficient time spent in Preparation.

Most people think of preparation as making sure you have the proper preventive and detective controls in place to hopefully prevent, and if not, detect a breach. But preparation needs to include many other aspects including, an incident management framework, a response strategy, and a communication plan.

The incident management framework defines every aspect of your incident response team, from who the participants are to who is in charge to how the team communication will work. In most companies IR has become a technical IT function. While having the correct technical resources to respond to an incident is important, having the correct management structure in place to effectively manage the incident is equally important. Dont forget to include legal and communications functions in the incident response team. They will be indispensable in a public breach.

The response strategy comprises the processes and procedures that will be used in the case of an incident. One great way to develop these processes and procedures is to run table top exercises and mock incident exercises with the IR team. The output of these exercises should be moderately detailed plans to handle these incidents.By anticipating common scenarios in advance of an incident leads to the actual response to an incident being smoother and less stressful when an incident actually occurs. It is not possible to anticipate every conceivable incident, but think of the processes and procedures as building blocks that can be reused and modified in the case of a real incident.

An important part of any public incident is effective communication with the press and your external stakeholders such as customers and shareholders. An important part of this is going to be to get your legal and communications people on the same page as your executive. The time to be figuring out what you will and wont release publicly is not in the heat of an incident. In my experience this usually leads to paralysis and ultimately looks like you have something to hide or are trying to mislead. Much the same as your incident strategy, the communication plan is best divised in advance as part of the mock incidents and table top exercises. In my opinion communicating the truth, early and often, is the best approach. The communication function was where Sony fell down the worst, both with internaland external communications.

With this in mind it seems like a good time for all of us to review our IR plans in the light of some of the high profile breaches this year.

-- Rick Wanner - rwanner at isc dot sans dot edu- http://namedeplume.blogspot.com/ - Twitter:namedeplume (Protected)

(c) SANS Internet Storm Center. https://isc.sans.edu Creative Commons Attribution-Noncommercial 3.0 United States License.
Categories: Alerts

Grown Up Security Christmas List, (Wed, Dec 24th)

Latest Alerts - Wed, 12/24/2014 - 07:27

My wife is a Christmas music junkie. Starting right after Remembrance Dayevery moment in our house or car is filled with the sounds of Christmas music, either from her own iTunes collection (currently 623 songs and growing yearly), or streamed from the Internet or satellite radio. Every year there seems to be one song that becomes that ear worm and sticks with me for the entire Christmas season. A couple of years ago it was Oh Holy Night, another it was I Want a Hippopotamus for Christmas, this year I discovered a new one, at least to me. My Grown Up Christmas List. The song waswritten by Canadian David Foster and his then wife Linda Thompson-Jenner. It was originally recorded by David Foster with vocals byNatalie Cole in 1990, but probably the most famous version was recorded by Amy Grant in 1992, although it has been covered many times since. The jist of the song is that we should not be asking Santa Clausfor more stuff for Christmas, but that we our Christmas list should asktosolvesociety and the worlds problems. Definitely a good sentiment in these uncertain times.

Today I got thinking...if the ISC were to have a Grown Up Security Christmas list, what would be on it?

Please submit your ideas via the forum comments, or via our contact page.

-- Rick Wanner - rwanner at isc dot sans dot edu- http://namedeplume.blogspot.com/ - Twitter:namedeplume (Protected)

(c) SANS Internet Storm Center. https://isc.sans.edu Creative Commons Attribution-Noncommercial 3.0 United States License.
Categories: Alerts

Grown Up Security Christmas List, (Wed, Dec 24th)

Latest Alerts - Wed, 12/24/2014 - 07:27

My wife is a Christmas music junkie. Starting right after Remembrance Dayevery moment in our house or car is filled with the sounds of Christmas music, either from her own iTunes collection (currently 623 songs and growing yearly), or streamed from the Internet or satellite radio. Every year there seems to be one song that becomes that ear worm and sticks with me for the entire Christmas season. A couple of years ago it was Oh Holy Night, another it was I Want a Hippopotamus for Christmas, this year I discovered a new one, at least to me. My Grown Up Christmas List. The song waswritten by Canadian David Foster and his then wife Linda Thompson-Jenner. It was originally recorded by David Foster with vocals byNatalie Cole in 1990, but probably the most famous version was recorded by Amy Grant in 1992, although it has been covered many times since. The jist of the song is that we should not be asking Santa Clausfor more stuff for Christmas, but that we our Christmas list should asktosolvesociety and the worlds problems. Definitely a good sentiment in these uncertain times.

Today I got thinking...if the ISC were to have a Grown Up Security Christmas list, what would be on it?

Please submit your ideas via the forum comments, or via our contact page.

-- Rick Wanner - rwanner at isc dot sans dot edu- http://namedeplume.blogspot.com/ - Twitter:namedeplume (Protected)

(c) SANS Internet Storm Center. https://isc.sans.edu Creative Commons Attribution-Noncommercial 3.0 United States License.
Categories: Alerts

How I learned to stop worrying and love malware DGAs...., (Tue, Dec 23rd)

Latest Alerts - Tue, 12/23/2014 - 15:50

The growth of malware families using algorithms to generate domains in 2014 has been somewhat substantial. For instance, P2P Gameover Zeus, Post-Tovar Zeus and Cryptolocker all used DGAs. The idea is that code generates domains (usually but not always) by taking the data and running it throw some magic math to come up with a list of many domains per day. This allows the attacker to avoid static lists of domains for callbacks in their code and allow them additional flexibility to make takedowns a little more difficult. Instead of getting one domain suspects, now you have to get thousands suspended. And if you think the good guys are on to you, you can change your encryption seed and get a new list of domains.

That said, its also a double edged sword. If you can get the algorithm, you can proactively block an entire family in one foul swoop. Take, for instance, hesperbot. Garage4Hackers has a nice write up on how they reverse engineered the DGA and providea helpful script at the end.

This particular DGA doesnt generate many domains, but it provides a good example. From the word go, you can simply dump the list of domains into RPZ or another DNS blocking technology. Thats nice, but what if you wanted to do some threat intelligence ninjitsu instead?

You can take that list of domains, attempt to resolve them and then dump the active IPs and domains into a feed. Now you have data you can pivot off of, throw into CIF, or make available as OSINT to get mad love from your peers.

Currently I track 11 families this way and process about 200,000 domains every 10 minutes to generate feeds (my New Years goal is to increase that tenfold). That brings an interesting scalability problem to the fore... how to lookup that many hosts in parallel instead of serial. For that I use two linux commands: parallel (self-explanatory) and adns-tools. Adns-tools is a suite that allows for asynchronous DNS lookups across many hostnames. As long as you have a friendly DNS resolver that doesnt mind your unmitigated complete assault of its sensibilities, youre good to go.

Doing this allows patterns to emerge pretty quickly... usually it is the same IP addresses involved, typically they have a dedicated domain that does authoritative DNS for all the DGA-ized domains, and you can assess what nationality the actors are by what holidays they take from registering domains. :)

All for the price of learning a little bit of python, you can set up a homebrew malware surveillance system.

--
John Bambenek
bambenek \at\ gmail /dot/ com
Bambenek Consulting

(c) SANS Internet Storm Center. https://isc.sans.edu Creative Commons Attribution-Noncommercial 3.0 United States License.
Categories: Alerts

What do you think will be the top cybersecurity story of 2015?, (Tue, Dec 23rd)

Latest Alerts - Tue, 12/23/2014 - 15:35

I was asked by a reporter a few days ago what I thought the top cybersecurity story of 2015 will be. 2014 saw some big stories, Target (and the myriad of PoS breaches), Heartbleed/Shellshock/et al, Sony...

Will it be the year people finally get serious about cybersecurity or will the status quo prevail? Leave your thoughts in the comment section below and will follow up next week.

--
John Bambenek
bambenek \at\ gmail /dot/ com
Bambenek Consulting

(c) SANS Internet Storm Center. https://isc.sans.edu Creative Commons Attribution-Noncommercial 3.0 United States License.
Categories: Alerts

ISC StormCast for Tuesday, December 23rd 2014 http://isc.sans.edu/podcastdetail.html?id=4287, (Tue, Dec 23rd)

Latest Alerts - Mon, 12/22/2014 - 18:36
(c) SANS Internet Storm Center. https://isc.sans.edu Creative Commons Attribution-Noncommercial 3.0 United States License.
Categories: Alerts

North Korea Internet Down, (Mon, Dec 22nd)

Latest Alerts - Mon, 12/22/2014 - 16:02

Jordan and others have written in about North Korea being offline. Arbor has a great post with some analysis (http://www.arbornetworks.com/asert/2014/12/north-korea-goes-offline/). According to the article, the netblock that is being targted is175.45.176.0 175.45.179.255. For more detail follow the link above.

--

Tom Webb

(c) SANS Internet Storm Center. https://isc.sans.edu Creative Commons Attribution-Noncommercial 3.0 United States License.
Categories: Alerts

Cybertalent on the Cheap, (Mon, Dec 22nd)

Latest Alerts - Sun, 12/21/2014 - 18:00

I recently attended an information security meetup and one of the main topics was building up security resources on a state/local government budget. This is not an easy task, but is something many people are facing.

When recruiting on a budget, it seems best to determine what makes a good security analyst. You are likely not going to be able to hire anyone with serious infosec training, so you need to look for raw talent. Much has been written about this, but here are the major qualities I look for.

  1. Strong experience in two or more of the following:

    1. Coding/Scripting

    2. Network Management

    3. Server Administration (Windows and Linux)

    4. Management of Core Services (DNS,Mail, DBA, ect..)

  2. Hungry to learn anything and independent learner

  3. Task oriented

  4. Wants a deeper understanding how attacks/defense work

Once you have picked a successful candidate, you">Please post in the comments about your experiences building talent and how long to get them self sufficient.

--

Tom Webb

(c) SANS Internet Storm Center. https://isc.sans.edu Creative Commons Attribution-Noncommercial 3.0 United States License.
Categories: Alerts

ISC StormCast for Monday, December 22nd 2014 http://isc.sans.edu/podcastdetail.html?id=4285, (Mon, Dec 22nd)

Latest Alerts - Sun, 12/21/2014 - 16:44
(c) SANS Internet Storm Center. https://isc.sans.edu Creative Commons Attribution-Noncommercial 3.0 United States License.
Categories: Alerts

Which NTP Servers do You Need to Patch?, (Sat, Dec 20th)

Latest Alerts - Sun, 12/21/2014 - 15:56

(Also see our earlier diary about thisvulnerability)

While people generally know where their real NTP servers are, all to often they dont know that theyve got a raft of accidental NTP servers - boxes that have NTP enabled without the system maintainers knowing about it. Common servers on the network like routers or switches (often when these are NTP clients, they are also NTP servers), PBXs and VOIP gateways, mail servers, certificate authorities and so on.

In these days of auto-updates, you would think that most NTP servers would be patched against the vulnerabilities found by the Google team and described in story written up by Johannes earlier this evening.

However, it only took until the second host checked to find a very out of date server. Unfortunately, its the main NTP server of a large Canadian ISP (Oops). What I also found along the way was that many servers only report 4 as a version, and that from the -sV switch, not from ntp-info. So depending on your internal servers and how they are configured, it may be time for us to start using authenticated scans using tools like Nessus to get service versions for our NTP servers. Hopefully that">C:\">Nmap scan report for ntp.someisp.ca (x.x.x.x)
Host is up (0.0045s latency).
rDNS record for x.x.x.x: khronos.tor.someisp.ca
PORT STATE SERVICE VERSION
123/udp open ntp NTP v4
| ntp-info:
| receive time stamp: 2014-12-20T02:47:52
|">version: ntpd 4.1.1c-rc1@1.836 Thu Feb 13 12:17:19 EST 2003 (1)
| processor: i686
| system: Linux2.4.20-8smp
| leap: 0
| stratum: 3
| precision: -17
| rootdelay: 11.079
| rootdispersion: 33.570
| peer: 32471
| refid: x.x.x.x
| reftime: 0xd83f5fad.b46b9c30
| poll: 10
| clock: 0xd83f61d5.3a71ef30
| state: 4
| offset: -0.329
| frequency: 46.365
| jitter: 3.468
|_">Service detection performed. Please report any incorrect results at http://nmap.
org/submit/ .
Nmap done: 1 IP address (1 host up) scanned in 180.08 seconds

This server on the other hand, doesnt report the version in the ntp-info output. -sV reports version 4, but that">C:\ ">Nmap scan report for time.someotherserver.com (y.y.y.y)
Host is up (0.010s latency).
PORT STATE SERVICE VERSION
123/udp open ntp NTP v4
| ntp-info:
|_">Service detection performed. Please report any incorrect results at http://nmap.
org/submit/ .
Nmap done: 1 IP address (1 host up) scanned in 143.24 seconds

But really, after this year of vulnerabilties that weve seen in basic system services, its about time that folks took the SANS Top 20 to heart - the SANS Critical Controls that you really should be looking at if its your goal to secure your network - https://www.sans.org/critical-security-controls . The top 5 in the list sum up your first line of defense against stuff like this. Know whats on your network, know whats running on that, have a formal program of patches and updates, and scan regularly for new hosts, new services and new vulnerabilities. If its your thought that a single scan for this one vulnerability is the most important thing on your plate (or scanning for heartbleed or shellshock was earlier this year), then you have already lost - it">Quick Addendum/Update (Johannes):

CentOS and other Linux distros did release updates. However, the version string may not change. Check the Build Date. For example, on CentOS6:
Before patch:ntpd 4.2.6p5@1.2349-o Sat Nov 23 18:21:48 UTC 2013 (1)
After patch:">">" type="cosymantecnisbfw">

(c) SANS Internet Storm Center. https://isc.sans.edu Creative Commons Attribution-Noncommercial 3.0 United States License.
Categories: Alerts

Site www.nfc.usda.gov and www.usda.gov Currently Down, (Sun, Dec 21st)

Latest Alerts - Sat, 12/20/2014 - 19:11

We have received a report theNational Finance Center site www.nfc.usda.gov is currently returning a 500: Server Error (thanks Melissa) and the U.S. Department of Agriculture www.usda.gov is returning an IBM HTTP WebSphere software page. We are currently investigating to get additional information.

Update 1: www.usda.gov is now back up at 02:30 GMT

-----------

Guy Bruneau IPSS Inc. gbruneau at isc dot sans dot edu

(c) SANS Internet Storm Center. https://isc.sans.edu Creative Commons Attribution-Noncommercial 3.0 United States License.
Categories: Alerts

Critical #NTP Vulnerability in ntpd prior to 4.2.8, (Sat, Dec 20th)

Latest Alerts - Sat, 12/20/2014 - 05:44

The Google security team discovered several vulnerabilities in current NTP implementations, one of whichcan lead to arbitrary code execution [1][2]. NTP servers prior to version 4.2.8 are affected.

There are some rumors about active exploitation of at least some of the vulnerabilities Google discovered.

Make sure to patch all publicly reachable NTP implementations as fast as possible.

Mitigating Circumstances:

Try to block inbound connections to ntp servers who do not have to be publicly reachable. However, be aware that simple statefull firewalls may not track UDP connections correctly and will allow access to internal NTP servers from any external IP if the NTP server recently established an outbound connection.

ntpd typically does not have to run as root. Most Unix/Linux versions will configure NTP using a lower privileged users.

According to the advisory at ntp.org, you can also:

Disable Autokey Authentication by removing, or commenting out, all configuration directives beginning with thecryptokeyword in yourntp.conf">A few Ubuntu and CentOS systems I tested, as well as OS X systems, do not seem to use autokey.

[1]http://www.kb.cert.org/vuls/id/852879
[2]">In the NTP code, a section of code is missing a return, and the resulting error indicates processing did not stop.

" type="cosymantecnisbfw">

(c) SANS Internet Storm Center. https://isc.sans.edu Creative Commons Attribution-Noncommercial 3.0 United States License.
Categories: Alerts

Bridging Datacenters for Disaster Recovery - Virtually, (Fri, Dec 19th)

Latest Alerts - Fri, 12/19/2014 - 14:43

Its been a while since we talked about Disaster Recovery issues - the last diary I posted on this was on using L2TPv3 to bridge your Datacenter / Server VLAN to the same VLAN at a DR site, over an arbitrary Layer 3 network (https://isc.sans.edu/diary/8704)

Since then, things have changed. Theres a real push to move DR sites from a rack in a remote office location to recognized IaaS cloud locations. With that change comes new issues. If you are using your own servers in a colocation facility, or using IaaS VM instances, rack space for a physical router may either come with a price tag, or if its all virtual, there might be no rack space at all.

In my situation, I had two clients in this position. The first customer simply wanted to move their DR site from a branch office to a colocation facility. The second customer is a Backup-as-a-Service Cloud Service Provider, who is creating a DR as a service product. In the first situation, there was no rack space to be had. In the second situation, the last thing a CSP wants is to have to give up physical rack space for every customer, and then deploy CSP owned hardware to the client site - that simply does not scale. In both cases, a VM running a router instance was clearly the preferred (or only) choice.

Virtual routers with enterprise features have been around for a while - back in the day we might have looked at quagga or zebra, but those have been folded into more mature products these days. In our case, we were looking at Vyatta (now owned by Brocade), or the open-source (free as in beer) fork of Vyatta - Vyos (vyos.net). Cisco is also in the game, their 1000V product supports IOS XE - their bridge L2 over L3 approach uses OTV rather than L2TPv3 or GRE. Youll find that most router vendors now have a virtual product.

Anyway, Working with Vyatta/Vyos configs isnt like Cisco at all - their configs look a whole lot more like you might see in JunOS. While Vyos supports the L2TPv3 protocol we know and love, its a brand new feature, and it comes with a note from the developer if you find any bugs, send me an email (confidence inspiring, that). Vyatta doesnt yet have that feature implemented. So I decided to use GRE tunnels, and bridge them to an ethernet interface. Since this tunnel was going to run over the public internet, I encrypted/encapsulated the whole thing using a standard site-to-site IPSEC tunnel.font-family:" times="">The relevant configs look like the one below (just one end is shown) Note that this is not the entire config, and all IP">Please - use our comment form and let us know if youve used a different method ofline-height: normal">line-height: normal">line-height: normal">line-height: normal">line-height: normal">line-height: normal">line-height: normal">line-height: normal">First, define the bridge interface. Not that STP (Spanning Tree Protocol) is disabled. You likely want this disabled unless youline-height: normal">line-height: normal">line-height: normal">line-height: normal">line-height: normal">line-height: normal">line-height: normal">line-height: normal">line-height: normal">line-height: normal">line-height: normal">line-height: normal">The ETH0 interface is on the server VLAN (or port group if you are using standard ESXi vSwitches) this is the VLAN that you are bridging to the DR site.line-height: normal">line-height: normal">line-height: normal">line-height: normal">line-height: normal">line-height: normal">line-height: normal">line-height: normal">line-height: normal">line-height: normal">line-height: normal">line-height: normal">line-height: normal">line-height: normal">line-height: normal">line-height: normal">line-height: normal">line-height: normal">line-height: normal">line-height: normal">line-height: normal">line-height: normal">line-height: normal">line-height: normal">The GRE tunnel is also bridged, and also doesnt have an IP address. The encapsulation of GRE-bridge is the same as GRE (IP protocol 47), but the gre-bridgeline-height: normal">This stuff is all important for your security posture, but is not relevant to the tunneling or bridging, so Iline-height: normal">line-height: normal">line-height: normal">line-height: normal">line-height: normal">line-height: normal">line-height: normal">line-height: normal">line-height: normal">line-height: normal">line-height: normal">line-height: normal">line-height: normal">line-height: normal">line-height: normal">line-height: normal">line-height: normal">line-height: normal"> line-height: normal">line-height: normal">line-height: normal">line-height: normal">line-height: normal">line-height: normal">line-height: normal">line-height: normal">line-height: normal">line-height: normal">line-height: normal">line-height: normal">line-height: normal">line-height: normal">line-height: normal">line-height: normal">line-height: normal">line-height: normal">line-height: normal">line-height: normal">line-height: normal">line-height: normal">line-height: normal">line-height: normal">line-height: normal">line-height: normal">line-height: normal">line-height: normal">line-height: normal">line-height: normal">line-height: normal"> line-height: normal">line-height: normal">line-height: normal">line-height: normal">mso-bidi-font-family:Symbol"> Note that the peer IP is the public / NATmso-bidi-font-family:Symbol"> IDs have to be created for each end - these routers use XAUTH when you define a pre-shared key, so to avoid having them use the FQDN, itmso-bidi-font-family:Symbol"> The traffic match for encryption is defined by the source prefix+destination prefix+protocol. In our case, its the management IP of the customer router AND the matching IP on the cloud router AND GREmso-bidi-font-family:Symbol">mso-bidi-font-family:Symbol"> Take some care in defining the pre-shared key. If a word occurs on your corporate website, facebook page, or linkedin (or in a dictionary), its a bad choice, LEET-speak or no.mso-bidi-font-family:Symbol"> We set both ends to initiate, which enables both init and respond. This allows either end to start the tunnel

===============
Rob VandenBrink
Metafore

(c) SANS Internet Storm Center. https://isc.sans.edu Creative Commons Attribution-Noncommercial 3.0 United States License.
Categories: Alerts

What's Wrong with Bridging Datacenters together for DR?, (Fri, Dec 19th)

Latest Alerts - Fri, 12/19/2014 - 10:59

With two stories on the topic of bridging datacenters, youd think I was a real believer. And, yes, I guess I am, with a couple of important caveats.

The first is encapsulation overhead. As soon as you bridge using encapsulation, the maximum allowed transported packet size will shrink, then shrink again when you encrypt. If your Server OSs arent smart about this, theyll assume that since its all in the same broadcast domain, a full packet is of course OK (1500 bytes in most cases, or up to 9K if you have jumbo frames enabled). Youll need to test for this - both for replication and the failed-over configuration - as part of your design and test phase.

The second issue si that if you bridge datacenters to a DR or second (active) datacenter site, you are well positioned to fail over the entire server farm, as long as you can fail over your WAN connection and Internet uplink with them. If you dont, you end up with what Greg Ferro calls a network traffic trombone. (http://etherealmind.com/vmware-vfabric-data-centre-network-design/)

If you fail one server over, or if you fail over the farm and leave the WAN links behind, you find that the data to and from the server will traverse that inter-site link multiple times for any one customer transaction.

For instance, lets say that youve moved the active instance of your mail server to the DR Site. To check an email, a packet will arrive at the primary site, traverse to the mail server at site B, then go back to site A to find the WAN link to return to the client. Similarly, inbound email will come in on the internet link, but then have to traverse that inter-site link to find the active mail server.

Multiply that by the typical email volume in a mid-sized company, and you can see why this trombone issue can add up quickly. Even with a 100mb link, folks that were used to GB performance will now see their bandwidth cut to 50mb or likely less than that, with a comensurate impact on response times. If you draw this out, you do get a nice representation of a trombone - hence the name.

What this means is that you cant design your DR site for replication and stop there. You really need to design it for use during the emergency cases you are planning for. Consider the bandwidth impacts when you fail over a small portion of your server farm, and also what happens when your main site has been taken out (short or longer term) by a fire or electrical event - will your user community be happy with the results?

Let us know in our comment section how you have designed around this trombone issue, or if (as Ive seen at some sites), management has decided to NOT spend the money to account for this.

===============
Rob VandenBrink
Metafore

(c) SANS Internet Storm Center. https://isc.sans.edu Creative Commons Attribution-Noncommercial 3.0 United States License.
Categories: Alerts

ISC StormCast for Friday, December 19th 2014 http://isc.sans.edu/podcastdetail.html?id=4283, (Fri, Dec 19th)

Latest Alerts - Thu, 12/18/2014 - 17:57
(c) SANS Internet Storm Center. https://isc.sans.edu Creative Commons Attribution-Noncommercial 3.0 United States License.
Categories: Alerts

Exploit Kit Evolution During 2014 - Nuclear Pack, (Thu, Dec 18th)

Latest Alerts - Thu, 12/18/2014 - 12:06

This is a guest diary submitted by Brad Duncan.

Nuclear exploit kit (also known as Nuclear Pack) has been around for years. Version 2.0 of Nuclear Pack was reported in 2012 [1] [2]. Blogs like malware.dontneedcoffee.com have mentioned version 3.0 of Nuclear Pack in posts during 2013 [3] [4].

This month, Nuclear Pack changed its traffic patterns. The changes are significant enough that I wonder if Nuclear Pack is at version 4. Or is this merely an evolution of version 3, as weve seen throughout 2014? Lets look at the traffic.

In January 2014, traffic from Nuclear Pack was similar to what Id seen in 2013. Here" />

2014 saw Fiesta exploit kit-style URLs from Nuclear Pack. Also, like other exploit kits, Nuclear sent Flash and Silverlight exploits. Here" />

The above example has Silverlight, Flash, PDF and IE exploits. In each case, a payload was sent to the vulnerable VM. The traffic consists of two TCP streams." />

These patterns are not far off from the beginning of the year. I only saw additional exploits from Nuclear Pack that I hadnt noticed before.

In December 2014, Nuclear Pack moved to a different URL structure. I first noticed this on a pcap from Threatglass.com [7]. Initially, Id mistaken the traffic for Angler exploit kit." />

Here" />

Since the change in URL patterns, Nuclear Pack is XOR-ing the malware payload. The image below shows an example where one of payloads is XOR-ed with the ASCII string: DvnQkxI

The change in traffic patterns is fairly significant for Nuclear Pack. I havent found any reason on why the change occurred. Is this merely an evolution, or do these changes indicate a new version of Nuclear Pack?

----------

Brad Duncan is a Security Analyst at Rackspace, and he runs a blog on malware traffic analysis at http://www.malware-traffic-analysis.net

References:

[1] http://blog.spiderlabs.com/2012/04/a-new-neighbor-in-town-the-nuclear-pack-v20-exploit-kit.html

[2] http://www.webroot.com/blog/2012/10/31/nuclear-exploit-pack-goes-2-0/

[3] http://malware.dontneedcoffee.com/2013/08/cve-2013-2465-integrating-exploit-kits.html

[4] http://3.bp.blogspot.com/-iqXmOKC5Zgk/UieYOEA8jPI/AAAAAAAAA_c/nlX2cgxhyZo/s1600/screenshot_2013-09-04_020.png

[5] http://malware-traffic-analysis.net/2014/01/24/index.html

[6] http://malware-traffic-analysis.net/2014/09/29/index.html

[7] http://threatglass.com/malicious_urls/firstliving-org

[8] http://malware-traffic-analysis.net/2014/12/12/index.html

(c) SANS Internet Storm Center. https://isc.sans.edu Creative Commons Attribution-Noncommercial 3.0 United States License.
Categories: Alerts

ISC StormCast for Thursday, December 18th 2014 http://isc.sans.edu/podcastdetail.html?id=4281, (Thu, Dec 18th)

Latest Alerts - Wed, 12/17/2014 - 18:29
(c) SANS Internet Storm Center. https://isc.sans.edu Creative Commons Attribution-Noncommercial 3.0 United States License.
Categories: Alerts

Is the polkit Grinch Going to Steal your Christmas?, (Wed, Dec 17th)

Latest Alerts - Wed, 12/17/2014 - 09:22

Alert Logic published a widely publizised blog outlining a common configuration problem with Polkit. To help with dissemination, Alert Logic named the vulnerability Grinch [1] .

In some ways, this isnt so much a vulnerability, as more a common overlypermissive configuration of many Linux systems. It could easily be leveraged to escalate privileges beyond the intent of the polkitconfiguration.

Lets first step back: In the beginning, there was sudo. Sudo served the Unix community well for many decades. I had to Google this myself, but looks like sudo initially was developed in 1986 [2]. Sudois relatively simple in its approach. A simple configuration file outlines who can run what command as what user. Of course, it isnt always as simple, as some software (e.g. many editors) allow the user to spawn shells, but for the most part administrators have found ways to fix these problems over the years. Most importantly, proper ly configured sudo requires the user to enter a password.

Polkit works differently then sudo. With sudo, I configure which software a user is allowed to run as root (or another user). With polkit, I configure which privileges a user is allowed to take advantage of while running a particular piece of software.

The problem pointed out by Alert Logic is two fold. First of all, the default polkitconfiguration on many Unix systems (e.g. Ubuntu), does not require authentication. Secondly, the polkit configuration essentially just maps the wheels group, which is commonly used for sudo users, to the polkit Admin. This gives users in the wheel group access to administrative functions, like installing packages, without having to enter a password.

The main risk is privilege escalation. With sudo, an attacker would have to enter the users password after compromising a lesser user account in the wheel group. With polkit, all it takes is to install a package using the polkit tool pkcon, which takes advantage of the loose polkit configuration to install packages.

What should you do? What is the risk?

First, have a relaxed christmas and enjoy it with your family. Next, take a look around your network and narrow down how is a member of the wheel group. Only administrators should be a member of the group (people who change system configurations and install software for a living). If you got some time between now and Jan 1st: Read up on Polkit and educate yourself as to what it does.

After new year: Make sure you understand how polkit action are logged, and start reviewing them. Polkit is still new, so many system administrators dont know about it and may ignore the alerts.

Of course, Shellshock and this Polkitissue make a great 1-2 punch to get root on a Unix system. But I doubt a system still vulnerable to Shellshock has no other privilege escalation vulnerability. So I dont think it this is such a huge issue. Fix Shellshock first if that is the case.

And as always, make sure to read the original Alert Logic document to get all the details.

[1] https://www.alertlogic.com/blog/dont-let-grinch-steal-christmas/
[2]http://www.sudo.ws/sudo/history.html

---
Johannes B. Ullrich, Ph.D.
STI|Twitter|LinkedIn

(c) SANS Internet Storm Center. https://isc.sans.edu Creative Commons Attribution-Noncommercial 3.0 United States License.
Categories: Alerts

Certified pre-pw0ned Android Smartphones: Coolpad Firmware Backdoor, (Wed, Dec 17th)

Latest Alerts - Wed, 12/17/2014 - 06:44

Researchers at Palo Alto found that many ROM images used for Android smart phones manufactured by Coolpad contain a backdoor, giving an attacker full control of the device. Palo Alto named the backdoor Coolreaper.

With Android, it is very common for manufacturers to install additional applications. But these applications are installed on top of the Android operating system. In this case, Coolpad integrated additional functionality into the firmware of the device. This backdoor was then used by Coolpad to push advertisements to its users and to install additional Android applications.But its functionality goes way beyond simple advertisements.

The backdoor provides full access to the device. It allows the installation of additional software, accessing any information about the device, and even notifying the user of fake over the air updates.

How important is this threat?

Coolpad devices are mostly used in China, with a market share of 11.5% according to the report. They are not found much outside of China. The phones are typically sold under brands like Coolpad, Dazen and Magview.

The following domains and IPs are used for the CC channel:

113.142.37.149, dmp.coolyn.com, dmp.51coolpad.com, icudata.coolyun.com, icudata.51coolpad.com, 113.142.37.246, icucfg.coolyun.com and others. Blocking and logging outbound traffic for these IPs will help you identify affected devices.

For details, see the Palo Alto Networks report athttps://www.paloaltonetworks.com/threat-research.html

---
Johannes B. Ullrich, Ph.D.
STI|Twitter|LinkedIn

(c) SANS Internet Storm Center. https://isc.sans.edu Creative Commons Attribution-Noncommercial 3.0 United States License.
Categories: Alerts
Syndicate content